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1. Introduction 
 
Electricity distribution networks are highly capital intensive systems and timely 
investments to maintain and upgrade the assets are crucial for long-term reliability and 
expansion of their service. In coming years, in the UK, and elsewhere in Europe, many 
distribution networks are in need of extensive investments in their aging assets. At the 
same time, aspects of energy policy concerning climate change, renewable energy 
sources, energy efficiency, demand side management (DSM), network energy loss 
reduction, quality of service standards, and even security of supply (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2008) require active, flexible, and smart networks that can be achieved through 
significant investments.  
At the same time, the utilities’ investment decisions are dependent on the regulatory 
framework within which they operate. Following the liberalisation of the electricity 
sectors around the world, the introduction of incentive regulation regimes based on 
RPI-X models and benchmarking has in most cases improved the efficiency of network 
utilities. Cost savings can be achieved either in operation and maintenance (Opex) and 
capital expenditures (Capex). Evaluation of efficiency potential in Capex is a 
challenging task. The main difficulty in incentivising investments is in the discrepancy 
between the long economic life and the cyclical nature of network assets on the one 
hand and the considerably shorter (five years in the UK) distribution price control 
periods on the other. Here both better planning and implementation of investments or 
a mere reduction in investments can both appear as achieving efficiency improvement 
in the short and medium-term while the implications of under-investment can become 
apparent in the long run.  
Most of the efficiency improvements in the UK Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) 
have been in the form of savings in Opex which have been subject to stricter 
regulatory benchmarking and incentives. However, capital investments are not an 
integrated part of the cost benchmarking exercise and individual utility investment 
plans need to be approved by the regulator. The regulator has developed incentive 
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schemes resembling a menu of options to encourage efficiency in capital investments 
based on engineering consultants’ assessments. Nevertheless, assessing the 
effectiveness of investment efficiency incentives remains a difficult task due to the 
long time-horizons involved in network investments,  information asymmetry between 
the regulator and the utility, and the five-year focus of distribution price control 
reviews. 
The investments needs of the different regions of a network can vary greatly mainly 
due to differences in asset age and load growth. At the same time, the investment 
needs of meeting some of the above mentioned requirements from active and flexible 
networks can have mainly localised effects on the networks. For example, increase in 
distributed or micro generation in parts of the network or interest in power generation 
activities by councils and communities can lead to such local network effects. 
Therefore, there is a need for models that can be used to assess and regulate 
investments at sub-network level. 
This chapter describes and utilises the use of a network investment assessment model 
developed as a practical tool to identify and assess the investment requirements of a 
particular group of distribution networks in the UK. A broadening of the scope of 
network investments to include demand-related measures such as micro-generation, 
distributed generation, and energy efficiency is likely to achieve overall investment 
reductions. However, the regulatory framework also needs adapt in accordance with 
the changing role of the future networks and in order to harness the benefit of a wider 
range of investment possibilities.  
The next section provides the main features of the current UK distribution network 
regulation. Section 3 discusses regulation of active networks and demand. Section 4 
discusses demand for distribution network services and drivers for capital investments. 
Section 5 describes a network model developed by EDF Energy for assessing local 
investment needs of networks which is used in our analysis. Section 6 offers some 
discussion of future distribution regulation frameworks and conclusions.  
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2. Distribution Networks and their Operating Environment 
 
2.1 Background 
 
This section describes the role of electricity distribution networks and their operating 
environment emphasizing the importance of capital investments in the networks and 
the role of regulation for achieving the appropriate type and level of investments in 
the networks. The features of the UK incentive regulation and benchmarking regime 
are described in detail elsewhere in the literature (see, e.g., Pollitt, 2005; Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2007). 
The electricity system consists of generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
activities. Generation comprises production and conversion of electric power. 
Transmission involves long distance transportation of electricity at high voltage. 
Distribution is transportation of low voltage electricity through local networks from the 
transmission network to customers’ premises. The supply function consists of 
metering, billing, and sale of electricity to end-users. The generation and supply 
activities are generally regarded as potentially competitive. The transmission and 
distribution networks are characterised as natural monopolies and are hence subject 
to economic regulation. 
Distribution networks consist of overhead lines, cables, switchgear, transformers, 
control systems and meters to transfer electricity making them capital intensive 
activities. Much of these assets have long economic lives and become sunk costs upon 
investment. Also, distribution networks have a diverse set of residential, commercial, 
and industrial customers in terms usage level as well as consumption patterns. As 
demand for electricity service continues to increase the existing networks need to 
gradually be replaced and expanded and the utilities can experience investment cycles.  
Due to their strategic position in the electricity system - as the main physical interface 
to end-users as well as to distributed generation (DG) sources, micro-generation units, 
smart meters, and the transmission network - distribution networks will have a central 
5 
 
role to play in enabling an active demand side and a future low carbon electricity 
system. Living up to this expectation requires that these utilities undertake substantial 
investments in new technologies and solutions that transform them to active, flexible, 
and smart networks.  
As electricity distribution is a capital intensive activity the efficiency with which the 
required investments are undertaken is a concern for the regulator. The main aim of 
electricity reform in general and incentive regulation of networks in particular is to 
provide utilities with incentives to improve their operating and investment efficiency 
and at the same time to ensure that consumers benefit from the gains. However, 
despite progress in economic regulation of networks in recent years, devising suitable 
incentives for network investments still remains a work in progress and a challenge for 
the regulators (see Joskow, 2008, Ofgem 2010). 
 
2.2 The Regulatory Framework 
 
As a result of the reform, there have been significant changes in the way that DNOs 
structure their business and the range of activities in which they are involved. For 
example, in the UK, several DNOs have active second-tier supply businesses and most 
are active in the supply of gas as well as electricity. This provides opportunities for joint 
marketing of the two fuels. Meanwhile some DNOs are now in different ownership 
from their former supply businesses. Following a series of mergers, the distribution 
businesses of the 14 original regional electricity companies (RECs) are currently (late 
2010) owned by 7 independent companies. 
The regulation model of distribution networks in Britain consists of a hybrid of 
incentive schemes. Under the current arrangements, the operating expenditures, 
capital expenditures, quality of service, and network energy losses are incentivised 
separately and under different types of schemes within a building block framework. 
The utilities’ controllable operating expenditures (Opex) are incentivised by 
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benchmarking these against an efficient frontier that is made up of the best practice 
DNOs in the sector. The allowed Opex of individual DNOs is set such that it requires 
them to close a specific proportion of their performance gap relative to the frontier 
during the price control period. In addition, the DNOs are given a general technical 
efficiency improvement target that is common to all DNOs (Pollitt, 2005; Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2007). 
In response to regulators incentives and benchmarking, operating expenditures of 
DNOs have fallen significantly while new investments are added to a growing 
regulatory asset base. As a result, capital investments are increasingly driving the 
regulated revenue of the DNOs. 
 
2.3 The Price Control Process 
 
The process for assessing the required level of capital expenditure over a price control 
review period is as follows. Utilities must draft business plans which include projected 
capital expenditure. These are then audited by a firm of engineering consultants, 
working for Ofgem. Usually these consultants recommend lower levels of capital 
expenditure than that proposed by each utility. This gives a base level of required 
capital expenditure to which an incentive scheme is applied. The incentive scheme 
resembles a menu of contracts regulation model. The menu of contracts approach is 
appealing at the presence of strong information asymmetry. However, this approach is 
not widely used in practice with the main difficulty being development of a set of 
suitable menu of options (Pollitt, 2005). 
In addition, quality of service and network energy losses are incentivised separately 
through performance standards and targets. The targets for each DNO are individual 
and deviation from these results in company specific penalties and rewards calculated 
based on an elaborate system. The rewards and penalties directly affect the total 
allowed revenue. In order to avoid jeopardizing financial viability of the companies, the 
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maximum amount subject to quality of service reward and penalty scheme is capped 
as a percentage of allowed revenue. The 2004 distribution price control (for the period 
2005-10) review introduced a sliding scale system to incentives capital investments by 
which the DNOs are rewarded by higher rate of returns if their actual investments are 
lower than the predicted levels (Ofgem, 2004). Collectively, these separate incentive 
schemes for Opex, Capex, quality of service, and network energy losses amount to a 
revenue cap incentive regulation. 
Due to the presence of potential trade-offs between Opex, Capex, quality of service, 
and network losses, from an economic efficiency point of view, it is preferable to use 
an integrated regulation and perhaps even a benchmarking model. Such a model 
would be based on a single total expenditure measure where all cost measures as well 
as some measure of monetary values of service quality and network losses are added 
together. The hybrid system in Britain is contrary to the notion of integrated overall 
incentive regulation. However, the adopted approach – segmented regulation - gives 
more control to the regulator to address specific and urgent areas of focus. It also 
involves less complicated modelling than a fully integrated benchmarking model would 
require and is more transparent and easier to implement. At the same time, the 
current incentive system cannot account for the potential trade-off between the 
specific regulated aspects of the utilities. 
The investment efficiency incentive scheme adopted by Ofgem as part of distribution 
price control reviews offers some flexibility for the utilities to perform better than their 
allowed and expected investment needs. This approach also, to some extent, enables 
the utilities, when possible, to take the trade-offs with operating expenditures into 
consideration. For the most recent distribution price control period (2010-15) there 
has been an equalization of the incentive rate for Opex and Capex reductions, which 
should reduce the incentives to inefficiently substitute capital expenditure for 
operating expenditure (see Ofgem, 2009). 
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3. Regulation of Active Network and Demand 
 
Ofgem’s benchmarking model of DNOs can be described as a short-term efficiency 
model as it only addresses the companies’ operating expenditures. This is in contrast 
to the long lead times necessary for the firms to change their asset structure. Capital 
expenditures are controlled and incentivised under a separate scheme. 
Achieving long-term efficiency improvements can require short-term increases in 
Capex and/or Opex expenditures that may not generate immediate efficiency 
improvements. Indeed, such expenditure increases by a given firm can weaken its 
short-term performance relative to other firms. This can prevent firms from embarking 
on types of investments that have long-term efficiency gains. Such efficiency 
improvements can be facilitated with incentives allowing the firms to keep a larger 
share of the benefits of the efficiency gains. This is particularly the case with 
investment programmes in active networks and demand which are capital intensive 
and investment projects can have long lead times than can exceed the current five-
year price control reviews. 
The mismatch between the long-term horizon of investments and short price control 
periods can also have a negative effect on the cost of financing investments (see 
Ofwat/Ofgem, 2006). Longer regulatory periods (e.g. seven or ten years) can reduce 
uncertainty with regards to long-term investments and retaining their benefits. 
However, even substantially longer regulatory price control periods will likely not fully 
incentivise investments if the innovations appear to have even longer payback periods. 
The current regulatory framework will need to evolve in order to enable the transition 
of the networks from passive system components to active and flexible actors. For 
example, Niesten (2010) discusses some aspects of regulation that can help encourage 
the required investments in distribution networks to connect distributed generation 
(DG). Among others, for example, the study argues that DG can pay a capacity-based 
network connection charges and be paid for the amount of energy that they supply to 
distribution networks. 
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Saplacan (2008) describes how the perception of the activities of the DNOs has evolved 
and distinguishes between network ownership and network operation, the former 
being natural monopoly while the latter can potentially be open to ‘competition for 
markets’. The study outlines a detailed breakdown of the different types of activities of 
distribution networks some of which can potentially be subject to competition. In the 
coming years, due to technological progress the dividing lines between regulation and 
the market can be redrawn so that more functions can be subjected to competition. 
Such a trend may result in a larger role for the use of market-based solutions for some 
aspects of active networks and demand. 
Ofgem has been conducting a review of its price control processes. This has already led 
to proposals for a move towards ‘Sustainable Network Regulation’, which will seek to 
put strengthen incentives for network companies to facilitate low carbon investments 
on their networks (e.g. of local distributed generation from renewable resources). This 
will be based on a wider definition of network outputs than in the past where 
regulated revenue will be based on incentives, innovation and outputs (so called RIIO 
regulation) (see Ofgem, 2010). 
 
4. Demand for Distribution Services and Drivers of Investment 
 
4.1 Background 
 
There is an extensive body of literature on electricity demand modeling and forecasts. 
Steinbuks (this volume) presents a review of the recent literature and references on 
this topic. However, the literature on electricity demand is predominantly focused on 
generation, capacity and, occasionally, related investments. The investment 
requirements of distribution networks are generally assumed to be a rough function of 
demand growth and typically at the macro-level and only a small subset of studies are 
concerned with demand for distribution network services and related investments. 
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Also, in the past utilities have mainly used simple demand forecast methods and 
technical analysis to predict and plan their investment requirements.  
In this paper we assess the drivers of demand for distribution network services and 
investments. Demand for electric energy and related services are initiated by end-
users. Generators provide the required electricity in real time which is then delivered 
through the high voltage transmission and medium-low voltage distribution networks. 
The need for services of distribution networks can therefore be characterized as a 
‘derived demand’ where network investment requirements are driven by end-users 
demand for electricity.  
The distribution networks provide the final physical link to the electricity system 
allowing grid connected electricity generation to be delivered to end-users at the 
required location, quantity, and time. The need for load-related investments of 
distribution utilities are linked to demand for electricity. It is useful to distinguish 
between the two main types of investments in distribution networks.  
i. Asset replacement and upgrading – These investments are aimed at 
maintaining the services of the network to existing customers. Asset 
renewal needs arise from aging assets that need to be renewed. In addition, 
demand growth from existing customers can lead to replacement and 
upgrading of certain asset types such as transformers. Asset registers and 
probability-based methods can be used to determine their optimum 
renewal time. The technical useful life of typical main network assets is long 
and their economic life may sometimes extend beyond their technical life. 
ii. Network expansion – the size and shape of distribution networks evolve 
gradually in response to the changes in the demand and customer base. 
Over time, some customers or sites may be disconnected and/or leave the 
network while new customers and sites are constantly connected to the 
network. Demand for new connections in existing or parts of the service 
area lead to investment in expansion of the system.  
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The relative share of investments in asset replacement and new investments can vary 
among utilities, for example, depending on the age profile of assets and network 
reinforcement and expansion requirements in their service areas.  
A question that arises is the extent to which macroeconomic type of variables can be 
used to forecast uncertain demand for network investment at the level of utilities’ 
service areas. Indeed this is a difficult task. In particular, the degree of difficulty 
increases for smaller service areas as the high-level or macro-economic type relations 
between the main factors become less reliable. An appealing approach is to use 
correlation analysis to identify accurate drivers for demand. However, the available 
data and previous studies are not sufficient for detailed service area analysis where 
indivisibilities of network capacity and demand at individual nodes in the distribution 
network may be large. For example, the length of the time-series used in correlations 
is too short to draw firm conclusions. Moreover, some correlations of potential driving 
factors of demand and investment among the service areas as, for example, used in 
CEPA (2009) and Frontier Economics (2007) reveal considerable regional differences 
which cannot be readily explained without further detailed studies. 
In particular, investment planning under economic uncertainty is difficult. Much of the 
historical data that can be used in forecasts are from periods of relatively stable 
economic and demand growth. The energy demand and the economy relationship 
under economic down-turn (at least in the short/medium-term) may be very different 
from those of past trends. However, the nature of this relationship at times of 
economic downturn is not well understood. For example, the effect of economic 
activity on demand for electricity can be asymmetric – i.e. the negative effect of GDP 
reduction on demand for energy is not simply the inverse of a positive effect of GDP 
growth as shown in Mork (1989) or the case of oil prices.  
In short, past trends are unlikely to provide good indicators for planning future 
network investment in particular for short-term applications to economic environment 
such as those of the late 2000s with negative economic growth. For example, flexible 
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work arrangements adopted some sectors of the economy may mark a change in trend 
labour-energy-economy relationships.  
 
4.2 Drivers of Load-Related Investments 
 
In this study we assess the load growth and associated investment requirements for 
two main customer groups – i.e. ‘residential’ and ‘non-residential sectors’.
4
 A number 
of indicators can be considered as drivers of residential and non-residential demand 
and investment. Error! Reference source not found. shows some investment drivers 
that can be used at utility level. These drivers differ in terms of the directness of their 
effect on demand and the tangibility of their relationship to actual investments in 
network assets. In addition, a recurring issue with many of the commonly used 
variables in energy forecasting models is that there is often strong degree of 
correlation among them making the identification of accurate demand and investment 
drivers more difficult. 
The choice between the above mentioned demand and investment drivers can depend 
on the level of analysis. In the absence of extensive data and inconclusive evidence on 
specific drivers for utility-level investments we need to turn to economic reasoning and 
engineering experience in order to select key indicators of demand and investment. 
 
5. Model Description 
 
This section describes a comprehensive long term maximum electricity demand 
forecast methodology developed by EDF Energy Networks, UK. It produces highly 
disaggregated outputs as it attributes unique demand growth values to every single 
                                                            
4
 By non-residential demand we mean commercial and industrial demand. 
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primary substation depending on their geographical location. Electricity demand is 
assumed to have a domestic and non-domestic component. This methodology is based 
on publicly available information and is therefore applicable to all DNOs in the UK. 
In the UK, all DNOs have an obligation under their distribution license to plan and 
develop the distribution networks in accordance with a standard not below that set 
out in the Engineering Recommendation P2/6 of the Energy Networks Association. This 
prescribes the level of redundancy in the distribution network needed for various 
magnitudes of demand and specifies the speed with which service to customers should 
be restored when these fail. Moreover, maintaining future P2/6 compliance influences 
the longer-term investment in distribution networks by indicating when reinforcement 
is necessary. 
A key factor when carrying out a reinforcement assessment is the prediction of future 
network demand. Knowing the existing demand on a substation, the underlying 
growth rate and any future demand increases due to specific known developments, 
allows an estimate to be made as to when a substation capacity will be insufficient to 
support demand in the future. With this knowledge, strategies can be developed to 
achieve optimal timing of network reinforcement.  
Although network reinforcement is driven mainly by demand growth, other factors 
such as energy efficiency and integration of distributed generation have the potential 
to defer some demand related network reinforcement. However, the networks should 
be provided with appropriate incentives to consider active network and demand type 
of investments alongside conventional network development investments. Developing 
a robust investment assessment tool based on demand forecast methodology is of 
paramount importance for DNOs to meet their long-term license conditions as 
economically and efficiently as possible. 
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5.1 Forecasting domestic electricity demand 
 
It is common practice within the electricity industry to calculate domestic electricity 
demand based on the combination of the annual average electricity unit consumption 
(kWh/year) and the maximum demand profile of a set of consumers. Studies of 
detailed demand data have indicated that daily demand profiles of consumers of the 
same type have a similar shape and also that the demand of a group of consumers is 
closely related to the annual electricity consumption of those consumers. This is the 
basis of a statistical analysis approach termed Demand Estimation Based on Units and 
Time (DEBUT)
5
, which uses the above information to calculate the average maximum 
demand of a group of consumers while recognising that the maximum demand of 
individual consumers may not occur at the same time. This measure of maximum 
average individual demand is called After Diversity Maximum Demand (ADMD), 
specified in kW, which is commonly used by distribution network planners to design 
new distribution networks. 
One of the benefits of basing ADMD calculation on annual average electricity unit 
consumption is that it takes into account demand-influencing factors such as the size 
of dwellings and the availability of gas supply. This is depicted in Figure 1, which shows 
the annual average electricity unit consumption (kWh/year) for all Local Authority 
Districts (Boroughs in London) within EDF Energy Networks licensed areas. This 
information is published by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DEEC) on 
an annual basis.
6
 
                                                            
5
 Engineering Technical Report 115 (1988). 
6
 DECC Sub-national energy consumption statistics 
(http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/). 
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As it can be seen, average electricity consumption can range from 3600 to 5900 
kWh/year and therefore using a single notional average would misrepresent regional 
consumption variations. For example, the average electricity consumption per dwelling 
in Islington is substantially less than in Mid Suffolk, as average properties in Islington 
would be smaller and proprieties in Mid-Suffolk would have limited access to gas 
networks. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average annual domestic electricity consumption per meter point (kWh) 
 
A crucial step in estimating the average domestic electricity demand going forward 
involves forecasting the growth in the number of electricity customers or the number 
of electricity meters since each electricity consumer has a meter, referred to as MPAN 
(Metering Point Administration Number). However, forecasting the number of MPANs 
directly is not always practicable and therefore alternative variables are required as a 
proxy to MPANs growth. On a theoretical level, dwellings, household and MPANs are 
strongly related variables, (see Table 1). 
16 
 
 
Table 1: Measures of residential electricity demand 
Household One person or group of people living at the same address who share a 
living area or at least one meal per day. 
Dwelling A self-contained accommodation unit that contains all of its rooms and 
essential facilities – e.g. a shared dwelling could be made up of 
households that share a kitchen (but not a living area, otherwise they 
would be only one household). 
MPAN Metering Point Administration Number – a unique number given to 
every electricity customer. 
 
However, a study commissioned for EDF Energy Networks shows that the growth of 
households appears to overestimate the growth in MPANs, most notably in London. 
On the other hand growth in the number of MPANs appears to follow growth in the 
number of dwellings ( 
 
Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Comparison of measures of residential demand in three EDF Energy 
Networks service areas: LPN, SPN and EPN 
 
Although the above analysis is based on the relatively short period of time for which 
EDF Energy Networks MPAN data is available, the one-to-one relationship between 
dwellings and MPANs seems reasonable as, in broad terms, new dwellings are 
expected to have their own electricity meter (MPAN) and hence represents a single 
new connection. 
In the UK, long term dwelling provision targets are set by the Government and this 
information is publicly available at Local Authority District level (Boroughs in London)
7
. 
Therefore, using this information together with the ADMD figures described previously 
allows the expected long-term domestic demand to be derived at a Local Authority 
District level (Boroughs in London) as described in  
Equation 1: 
 
                                                            
7
 Regional Spatial Strategy Plans such as “East of England Plan” (www.eera.gov.uk), “South East of 
England Plan” (www.southeast-ra.gov.uk)  and “The London Plan”(www.london.gov.uk/thelondonplan). 
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Equation 1 
Domestic demand (kW) = [Number of dwelling] x [ADMD/dwelling] 
 
5.2 Forecasting non-domestic electricity demand 
 
Production theory in economics generally regards energy, labour, and capital as the 
main input factors in production processes. Within this framework, energy and labour 
can be viewed as complementary inputs. However, a change in the relative prices of 
labour and energy can, in the long-run, lead to substitution of the relatively more 
expensive factor with the cheaper one (see Platchkov and Pollitt, this volume, for a 
longer run perspective on this). Theory also suggests that in the short-run the stock of 
capital is fixed while the use of labour can be more flexible. Hence an energy price 
shock in the short-term can result in some reduced use of labour. In the long-run the 
stock of capital becomes more flexible and some factor substitution in response to 
changes in relative prices can take place. 
Gross Value Added (GVA) is a measure of economic activity that in principle 
encompasses all energy use in production processes whether these are substitutes for 
or complimentary with the amount of labour input. A workplace-based measure of 
GVA (that allocates the income of commuters to the region in which they work) can be 
a good indicator of the industrial and commercial activity within the service area of a 
given DNO. However, local GVA is currently not available. Moreover, although GVA has 
interesting theoretical properties the suitability of it for the purpose of the present 
model is uncertain and needs to be examined carefully in future versions of the model. 
The main concern is the extent to which the theoretical relationships between labour, 
energy, and GVA or production still hold at disaggregated and fairly small geographic 
areas as required by the model. 
Hence in this chapter the described methodology uses the number of jobs as a proxy 
for non-domestic demand growth as detailed projections of appropriate detailed level 
are publicly available. A practical advantage of using labour as a driver of non-
19 
 
residential demand is that it is more easily observable and measurable in physical 
terms and hence is more easily translatable to specific investments in load related 
network assets where past engineering knowledge and experience can also aid the 
investment decisions.  
The electricity consumption statistics in the form of kWh/employee for all Local 
Authority Districts in the UK, are published by the Department of Energy Climate 
Change (DECC) on an annual basis
8
. At it can be seen in  
 
Figure 3, the average annual electricity consumption per employee varies significantly 
amongst the Local Authority Districts within EDF Energy Networks area of operation. 
The figure illustrates the diversity of non-domestic activity, which must be taken into 
account whilst forecasting non-domestic demand. 
 
                                                            
8
 DECC Sub-national energy consumption statistics 
(http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/). 
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Figure 3: Average annual industrial and commercial electricity consumption per 
employee (kWh) 
Source: Oxera analysis 
 
In order to translate the above information into demand (kW/employee), as opposed 
to energy (kWh/employee), the current methodology assumes a notional load factor, 
which takes a view of the average usage profiles of employees. The baseline figure 
assumes a usage profile of eight hours/day, six days/week, 50 weeks/year, which is 
equivalent to 2400h a year.
9
 The latter together with regional electricity consumption 
per employee ( 
                                                            
9
 The assumptions reflect the fact that some industrial and commercial users work for 6 or 7 days/week 
– i.e. more than the average 5 days/week. 
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Figure 3) produces a regional demand per employee (kW/employee) as in  
Equation 2. 
 
Equation 2 
kW/employee = kWh/employee ÷ usage profile 
 
The regional annual employment targets for all Local Authority Districts are currently 
published by the UK Government. This information provides a strong indication of the 
level of non-domestic activity, which can then be converted into electricity demand. 
This is achieved by multiplying regional employment targets by the regional demand 
per employee as in  
Equation 3: 
 
Equation 3 
Regional non
 
5.3 Regional electricity demand growth
 
The above sections describe the main factors that have an impact on domestic and 
non-domestic demand growth. A strength of the methodology described here is that it 
is based on publicly available information published by the 
Climat
institutions. Moreover, it allows all UK DNOs to take into account UK Government 
housing and employment targets and convert this information into electricity demand 
growth. 
 
-
e Change, Regional Development Agencies and other UK Government 
 
domestic demand (kW) =
[regional demand per employee (kW/e
Year 2010
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 [regional annual employment targets] X 
 
 
 
mployee)]
Department of Energy and 
 
 
Figure 
methodology. It depicts the regional demand growth for one of EDF Energy Net
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Figure 4: Regional demand growth in 2010, 2015, and 2020
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Figure 
within EDF Energy Networks’ EPN distribution network. Darker shades reflect higher 
demand growth. This provides a cl
growth will be more significant in coming years, which in turn provides a high level 
indication of where demand related network investment might be required.
 
5.4 Disaggregated electricity demand growth
 
Regional demand growth forecasts are important as they provide a high level 
indication of the main electricity demand growth areas. However, as part of any 
network reinforcement assessment, knowing the existing demand on an electrical 
substation and conseq
insufficient to support predicted demand, is of paramount importance.
The next stage of the demand growth methodology here described is to calculate 
demand growth at a primary substation level (typica
Local Authority District (regional) demand growth described above. This is achieved 
4 depicts the growth in maximum demand (MW)
uently being able to estimate when its capacity will be 
Year 2020
ear view of sections of the network where demand 
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using the transformer rating and geographical location of the secondary substations 
(typically 11/0.4kV), fed from each primary substation. Initially, the regional demand 
growth is spread across all secondary substations in a pro rata way. For example, this 
means that a 100kVA secondary substation will be allocated twice as much load as a 50 
kVA. This demand is then aggregated back to a primary substation level, producing 
highly-disaggregated demand growth forecasts. This is an important step in the overall 
methodology as it allows for primary substations that supply neighbouring local 
authority districts which have different housing and employment targets. This has 
been possible through the use of GIS (Geographic Information System) tools, as they 
take into account the geographical location of district boundaries and primary and 
secondary substations. 
Once demand growth forecast at a primary substation level is obtained, it is possible to 
identify those substations whose capacity would be insufficient to support predicted 
demand. Each primary substation is shown as an irregular shape cluster which 
represents the area it supplies. Here risk is defined as demand as a percentage of the 
primary substation capacity under N-1 conditions (firm capacity). Because of 
confidentially reasons the firm capacity of the primary substations have been 
randomly generated and do not therefore represent their real firm capacity. Risk 
higher than 100% is shown in the darkest shade, greater than 85% in the middle shade 
and risk levels lower than 85% are shown in the lightest shade. 
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distribution network would be subject to due to the regional demand growth 
portrayed in 
 depicts the level of risk that each primary substation within EDF Energy EPN 
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Each primary substation is shown as an irregular shape cluster which represents the 
area it supplies. Here risk is defined as demand as a percentage of the primary 
4 above. 
Year 2015
Year 2020
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substation capacity under N
reasons the firm capacity of the primary substations 
and do not therefore represent their real firm capacity. Risk higher than 100% is shown 
in the darkest shade, greater than 85% in the middle shade and risk levels lower than 
85% are shown in the lightest shade.
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 Figure 5 Primary substations risk level in 2010, 2015, and 2020
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Scale: 1:1,500,000
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As shown in the above illustration, the model produces a clear picture of the primary 
substations that might need reinforcement, due to demand growth, in order maintain 
an acceptable level of risk. This risk level is set by the Engineering Recommendation 
P2/6. Moreover, the model outputs provide planning engineers with an analytical and 
visual aid to identify low risk primary substations adjacent to high risk ones. With this 
information, the possibility to transfer load from high risk primary substations to 
neighbouring low risk ones could be assessed. This could be a cost efficient way to 
support demand growth, defer reinforcements, and reduce the level of risk of capacity 
constrained substations. 
 
6. Relevance of the Model for Active Network and Demand and 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, companies can use models (such as that of 
EDF described above) as sub-system network investment planning tools. The EDF 
model (for example) can use historical load development data and demand growth 
prognoses to determine emerging load-related investments in specific parts of the 
network at a detailed level. We also noted that network investments needs are capital 
intensive, most of the assets have long economic lives, and are often sunk costs upon 
investment. 
The EDF model has practical applications for the evaluation of active network and 
demand options by coordination these with need of the network for upgrade and 
expansion in response to load growth. It can do so by feeding into other models and 
assessments of need for conventional investments at network and sub-network levels. 
In particular, the model can be used to assess the potential for the use of competing 
generic network and demand activating options in relation to the characteristics and 
expected future needs of specific parts of the network.  
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Given the right regulatory incentives, such holistic approach to investments can 
increase the long-term economic and operational efficiency of the network. Such view 
of investment assessments will be fairly similar to the concept of Integrated Resource 
Planning (IPR) used by some public utility commissions in the US. Under IPR, regulated 
utilities are required to evaluate their generation capacity expansion plans not in 
isolation but also in relation to alternative supply sources such as other suppliers or 
demand-side options.  
Similarly, the corresponding factors in the context of load capacity expansion in 
distribution networks in response to demand growth, these options include DG 
sources, combined heat and power (CHP) micro-generation technologies, active 
demand and smart meters, and various energy saving and efficiency alternatives.  
At the same time, the level and nature of demand for electricity services is likely to 
change. For example, the expected emergence large scale adoption of electric vehicles 
(EVs) will add a fairly unknown but important to reckon with type of demand to the 
system. As discussed in Marsden and Hesse (this volume), the effect of large scale 
electric vehicles on total energy demand may not be very significant. However, their 
effect on system load could be considerable. A large scale adoption of EVs will require 
domestic as well as public charging facilities. In particular, provision of public charging 
facilities is likely to require fast charging and load-intensive facilities in order to 
encourage their use. The development of the infrastructure required for this will be 
costly and need careful assessment with regards to network planning. Similarly there 
may be significant effects as a result of the electrification of space heating via heat 
pumps (as discussed in Clarke et al., this volume). 
A site-specific but integrated approach to network investment that includes the range 
of new supply and demand options will be clearly beneficial and can be aided by the 
type of modeling discussed here. However, achieving the full potential of the above 
options requires development of new suitable regulatory incentives. However a 
discussion of such appropriate regulation and incentive models is outside the scope of 
the present chapter. 
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